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Pragmatic Reform:
Lessons from the South African
Experiment
BY J. WILLIAM CALLISON °

D

ean Johan Henning's article, Reforming Business Entity Law to
Stimulate Economic Growth Among the Marginalized: The
Modern South African Experience, is a thoughtful and thorough analysis of
recent changes to South African business entity laws. Dean Henning's
article does not use the term "democracy." However, one suspects that
Henning and others hope that increased popular participation in the South
African economic structure will foster a democracy and possibly diminish
or eliminate a caste system.' Some scholars have noted that corporate law

* Partner, Faegre & Benson LLP, Denver, Colorado; A.B. 1977, Oberlin
College; J.D. 1982, University of Colorado; L.L.M. 2000, Yale University. I thank
Maureen Sullivan Callison for her helpful comments.
'In my view, the heart of Dean Henning's article is found in the following
paragraph:
According to a discerning commentator, the introduction of the close
corporation is evidently aimed at a potentially more informal sector of the
economy. The close corporation can be seen as giving more power to a
lower class so that they may become more of a capitalist middle class. The
previous relatively simple enterprise of yesteryear has turned into conglomerates and multinationals of frightening size and complexity. The lower
classes cannot exercise real power because there are too many of them, and
they are not adequately trained to run an industrial society, least of all able
to operate under the complex Companies Act. In this respect the Close
Corporation Act can be seen as a moral achievement of a couple of
mercantile law experts of South Africa, comparable to the work of the
Wiehahn Commission on Labor Law reform, which was acknowledged by
the United Nations. People in society who have the intellectual and
organizational equipment (i.e., wealth) to deal with complex problems are
a class of people who benefit from problems being perceived as complex.
None more so the case than in company law. The wide-spread sham
compliance with company law can be interpreted as the result of accepting
the norms of the elite for the whole society. In a very definite sense it is
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has played a role in the democratization of the United States,2 but a more

founding prosperity on the oppression of other people. The apparatus with
which the rest of society was run was more elaborate than the rest of society
needed. The Close Corporations Act dismantles this apparatus in a sense,
and thus mitigates its oppressive character. "Thus the legal system looks
beyond the class interests of the business elite, doing justice to all classes,
applying the moral imperative."
Johan J. Henning, Reforming Business Entity Law to StimulateEconomic Growth
Among the Marginalized:The Modern South African Experience, 91 KY. L.J. 773,
783-84 (2003) (quoting Dirk DuToit, Applying the MoralImperative: The Close
Corporation,9 J. JURID. Sc. 108 (1984)). Henning notes that these underlying
political goals do not mean that the South African Close Corporations Act is
merely a "vicissitude of political expediency," and that the Act is a "first rate piece
of black letter law," but the fact that the Act is both carefully crafted and of broad
application does not detract from its power. Id. at 784. The Act is designed in part
to propel economic and social change in post-apartheid South Africa by enabling
marginalized people to enter into the South African economic system, thereby
giving them a stake in their society.
2 See, e.g., Stephen B. Presser, Thwarting the Killing of the Corporation:
Limited Liability, Democracy, and Economics, 87 Nw. U. L. REv. 148 (1992).
Presser notes that the expansion of corporate limited liability protections to small
business enterprises was instrumental in nature:
The popular democratic justification for limited liability is rarely observed
by modem scholars. Nevertheless, it appears that to the nineteenth-century
legislators in states such as New York, who mandated limited liability for
corporations' shareholders, the imposition oflimited liability was perceived
as a means of encouraging the small-scale entrepreneur, and of keeping
entry into business markets competitive and democratic. Without limitations
on individual shareholder liability, it was believed, only the very wealthiest
men, industrial titans such as New York's John Jacob Astor, could possess
the privilege of investing in corporations. Without the contributions of
investors of moderate means, it was felt, the kind of economic progress
states like New York needed would not be achieved.
The author of the most comprehensive study of New York legislative
policy toward corporations in the nineteenth century concluded that New
York's policy of limited liability, and its policy of encouraging incorporation by persons of modest means "facilitated the growth of a viable urban
democracy by allowing a wide participation in businesses that could most
advantageously be organized as corporations." "More importantly," he
suggested, New York's general incorporation statutes "helped equalize the
opportunities to get rich. The passage of general incorporation laws for
business corporations was the economic aspect of the political and social
forces that democratized the United States during the Age ofJackson, 18251855." This historian's insight has escaped modem legal economists.
Id. at 155-56 (internal citations omitted).
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applicable American equivalent would have been the use ofbusiness entity
law as a means of integrating African-Americans into political and
economic structures in the post-Civil War Reconstruction period.' Although
drawing cross-cultural historical parallels is a risky business at best, one is
led to wonder whether the failure of American Reconstruction demonstrates
that democracy and freedom cannot be obtained by private entrepreneurial
initiative alone (regardless of whether it involves free labor or capital), but
instead require a powerful national state guaranteeing equal standing in the
polity and equal opportunities in the economic system. If that is indeed the
case, one wonders whether South Africa is willing to depart from libertarian conceptions of economic liberalism, forging its own path toward a more
inclusive society and a more vital democracy.
Dean Henning's article evidences a pragmatic view that business
organization law should not be a matter of orthodox ideology imbedded in
an unchanging set of principles, but instead, like a coral reef, should grow
by accretion over time and should be hospitable to living things. His
pragmatic approach has American parallels. American pragmatic philosophy is based on a belief that ideas are tools devised by people "to cope with
the world in which they find themselves," that ideas are produced by
groups of individuals, that ideas are social constructs and are dependent on
their human carriers and their environment, and that the survival of ideas
depends on their adaptability.4 Business corporations do not exist independ-

3 Rather than business entity laws designed to permit participation of former
slaves in the economic system, "free labor" was considered a means for establishing freedom and some economic integration. See ERIC FONER, RECONSTRUCTION:
AMERICA'S UNFINISHED REVOLUTION 1863-1877 (1988). Foner writes:
[I]t remains true that [the Radical Republicans] hoped to reshape [American] Southern society in the image of the small-scale competitivecapitalism of the North. As Carl Schurz put it, "a free labor society must be
established and built up on the ruins of the slave labor society." While many
moderates shared this goal, few wished to hold Reconstruction hostage to
such a transformation. To Radicals, however, the South's political and
social "regeneration" formed two sides of the same coin. "My dream," one
explained in 1866, "is of a model republic, extending equal protection and
rights to all men.... The wilderness shall vanish, the church and the
school-house will appear; ... the whole land will revive under the magic
touch of free labor."
Id. at 235.
4 LOUIS MENAND, THE METAPHYSICAL CLUB xi-xii (2001). Menand also notes
that, regardless of [the pragmatic philosophers'] view of ideas' provisionality,
pragmatic philosophy was designed to support a democratic political system in
which everyone is equally in the game, and that ideas should constitute an ever-
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ently of some idea of the "corporation." The pragmatic view of corporate
law is that ideas about the social construct called a corporation change over
time as the device is adapted to present and future social and political
realities. South Africa's business entity laws are a powerful reminder that
the idea of the corporation, or of any other business entity form, is not
immutable and can be an ends-driven tool for meeting social needs.
Dean Henning's article also reflects an understanding that the
corporation is not merely an instrument for facilitating a market economy,
but is also a significant social and political institution. In American law,
the corporation is treated as a person such that it can contract, own
property, sue and be sued, and is subject to income tax liability (except
when it is not, such as the S corporation). Notwithstanding this recognition
of legal personality, there has been controversy over the place of the
corporation in contemporary American society. The principal issues at
stake in the continuing debate about corporate law theory involve individual responsibility and obligations, wealth distribution and redistribution,
and the use of state power to govern what might be perceived as private
relationships. This debate over whether the corporation is essentially a
private contractual arrangement, or whether the corporation is a public
institution with public obligations, is not new,5 and it has not been

changing means to this democratic end. See id. at 439-42.
' For example, the Dartmouth College case involved a suit by the board of
Dartmouth College, a Federalist-dominated private institution in Hanover, New
Hampshire, against its former treasurer, who had defected to Dartmouth University,
a Republican-dominate public university in Hanover, New Hampshire, to recover
the College's original charter and corporate property. Dartmouth College v.
Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518 (1819). The New Hampshire legislature, then
dominated by Republicans, had rewritten the College's charter to replace the
original trustees, rename the school, mandate religious freedom, reappoint a
Republican school president, and establish a board of overseers to represent this
public interest; in short, the legislature attempted to accomplish a state takeover of
a private institution by changing the corporation's organic documents. Id. at 53944, 554. The replaced trustees argued that the original charter constituted a contract
between Dartmouth College and the state, and that the legislature's actions violated
the United States Constitution's Contract Clause, which provides that no state may
pass a law "impairing the Obligation of Contracts." Id. at 557. The New Hampshire
Supreme Court distinguished between "private corporations," which are protected
from government intervention through the Contract Clause, and "public corporations," which are established to benefit the public and therefore are subject to
public control. Id. at 562-75. The court held that Dartmouth College was a public
institution; therefore, the Contract Clause did not prevent the people, acting
through their elected representatives, from intervening in corporate governance
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resolved.6
American business organization law has undergone significant change
over the last dozen years, with the promulgation of a new Uniform
Partnership Act and a new Uniform Limited Partnership Act, and the
creation and widespread adoption of the limited liability company, limited
liability partnership, and limited liability limited partnership business entity
forms. Dean Allan Vestal laments that these changes were made without
any underlying theory, that the drafters of the new statutes engaged in
nonpurposeful duplication that produced an unjustified lack of uniformity,
and that social costs were imposed by the new statutes without any
demonstrable social benefits.7 While I agree with these conclusions, I view
the underlying problem as a failure to recognize the public nature of
business organizations, to consider and define the social ends to be
achieved, and to pragmatically draft legislation relevant to those ends. The
new business organization statutes adhere to the individualistic, contractarian stance that has dominated academic discourse over the last generation,
and the statutes are based on an overarching commitment to property rights.
Under this property rights conception, it is believed that shareholders,
partners, members, and other business owners should not be compelled to
forego their right to maximize profits except to the extent that they have ex
ante contracted for limitations on these rights. The freedom-of-contract
approach to business organization law focuses on the extent to which legal

matters. Id. at 624.
The United States Supreme Court, then Federalist-dominated, reversed and held
that the New Hampshire legislature's actions were "repugnant to the constitution
of the United States." Id. at 654. In his concurring opinion, Justice Story repudiated
the "public" and "private" definition established by the New Hampshire Supreme
Court. Id. at 668-77. "[P]ublic corporations are such only as are founded by the
government, for public purposes.... If, therefore, the foundation be private,
though under the charter of the government, the corporation is private, however
extensive the uses may be to which it is devoted ... ." Id. at 669-70. Thus,
Dartmouth College became the basis for claims that the Contract Clause protects
corporate affairs from state regulatory intervention, and people who wished to
subject corporations to public accountability were required to find other (less
direct) means for doing so.
6See J. William Callison, Federalism,Regulatory Competition,andtheLimited
LiabilityMovement: The Coyote Howled and the Herd Stampeded,26 J. CORP. L.
951,965-78 (2001) (noting dominance of economic efficiency theory and contract
theory in corporate law, and recognizing the existence of alternative approaches,
including communitarian theory, to corporation law).
' Allan W. Vestal, Business Law Reform in South Africa: The Right Path, the
Right Reason, 91 KY. L.J. 829 (2003).
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rules facilitate private ordering. The law essentially becomes a set of
default rules designed to approximate the rules that would be adopted by
most people entering into a business relationship in the absence of a
particular, private agreement.
The dominant view that business organizations essentially are creatures
of private contract is found in the recent extension of limited liability
protections to all firm types, specifically to unincorporated business
organizations in which some or all owners previously had unlimited
personal liability, and in new statutory rules concerning owners' fiduciary
duties to the firm and their co-owners. Theoretical justifications for
expansive limited liability protection are grounded both in economic
efficiency theory and in the theory that business firms constitute a nexus of
private contracts (real and hypothetical) in which the government has a
minimal regulatory role.8 A conversation concerning the extension of
limited liability protection could have included discussions about the extent
to which utilitarian theories should apply and the extent to which business
organizations should be viewed as an extension of their owners that do not
separate owners from broader responsibilities to those affected by the
firm's activities. This conversation was not held, and the primary beneficiary of limited liability extension was the private business owner rather
than the commonwealth.
Similarly, although a more robust conversation was held concerning the
nature of fiduciary duties in unincorporated business organizations, the
various new statutes adopted an overarching premise that business
organizations are private structures, and therefore that fiduciary duties are
primarily a private contract matter rather than a collection of socially
determined rules of conduct.' Thus, in most of the new business organization statutes, the fiduciary duty of good faith and fair dealing has been
changed to a contract-based obligation, and the remaining fiduciary duties
have been limited in scope and have been made broadly amendable or
waiveable by contract." In the fiduciary duty arena, the last decade has
witnessed a privatization of business organization law in which broader
social values largely have been deemed irrelevant.

Callison, supra note 6, at 965-78.
9 See J. William Callison, Blind Men and Elephants:FiduciaryDuties Under
8

the Revised Uniform PartnershipAct, the Uniform Limited Liability Company Act,
and Beyond, 1J. SM. & EMERG. BUS. L. 109, 117-23 (1997).

" See, e.g., id. at 116 (noting that "RUPA drafters believed that the good faith
and fair dealing obligation arises from the partners' contractual relationship" and
"does not treat it as an independent fiduciary duty.").
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Dean Henning traces the rapid development of South African close
corporation statutes. Indeed, the American unincorporated business
organization statutes also developed and changed rapidly over the last
decade, and American business entity law continues to develop at a rapid
pace. However, one is struck by the multidimensional thinking that was
incorporated in the South African drafting process. While recent American
drafters limited their focus to the perceived private nature of business
organizations, the South African drafters recognized that laws governing
private business relationships can be a means to accomplish a public good
beyond profit maximization. Further, while American drafters seemed to
ignore history and to assume that it was the then-dominant corporate law
theory that fixed the role of business organizations, the South African
drafters recognized that they lived in history, acknowledged the historical
setting in which they operated, and attempted to draft legislation to fit that
dynamic setting. The lessons of the South African experience, particularly
its pragmatism and its recognition that business organization law has a
robust public dimension, should form a backdrop for the continuing
American business entity law reform process.

